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I.

INTRODUCTION
Recent issues of this journal contain a triad of articles1 canvassing state laws that add to

the basic requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2 for “standard”
due process hearings (DPHs).3 As noted in those articles, the IDEA is a model of “cooperative
federalism” that allows states to add to, but not subtract from, the law’s requirements for DPHs.4
Focused on these additions, the triad address the three successive stages of DPHs: (1) prehearing stage, including complaints, pre-hearing disclosure, and discovery;5 (2) hearing stage,
including party rights and the authority of the impartial hearing officer (HO);6 and (3) posthearing stage, including decisions, judicial review, and appeals. 7 As acknowledged in the
previous articles, the boundaries between the pre-hearing, hearing, and post-hearing stages of the
DPH are sometimes blurry, with certain provisions applying to more than one stage.8 The articles

1

Andrew M.I. Lee & Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act III: The Pre-Hearing Stage, 41 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2021) [hereinafter PreHearing Stage]; Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings Under the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2018) [hereinafter Hearing Stage]; Perry A. Zirkel, State
Laws for Due Process Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act II: The Post-Hearing Stage,
40 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2020) [hereinafter Post-Hearing Stage].
2

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2018). The original name of the IDEA was the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, Public Law 94-142.
Although the IDEA only uses the term “expedited” for differentiation, we use the term “standard” for all other due
process hearings as a default. However, a few state laws use the term “regular.” E.g., N.M. CODE R. §
6.31.2.13(I)(8)(c) (LexisNexis 2020) (“The hearing officer may grant such extensions in a regular case but may not .
. . in an expedited case.”) (emphasis added).
3

4

Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816,
830 (9th Cir. 1999) and Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982)). For
the connected doctrine of preemption, see infra text accompanying notes 27–50.
5

Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1.

6

Hearing Stage, supra note 1.

7

Post-Hearing Stage, supra note 1.

E.g., Post-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 2 & n.4 (noting that IDEA’s “stay put” provision keeps the child in the
“current educational placement” during both the hearing and post-hearing stages); Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1,
8
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also specifically excluded the corresponding state law additions to expedited DPHs,9 which are
more rapid DPH variations in the IDEA primarily for disciplinary changes in placement. 10
The purpose of this article is to fill this gap by systematically tabulating state law
additions to expedited DPH hearings. This article will not repeat the extensive and detailed
coverage of the previous articles except to the extent where boundaries between aspects of DPHs
are blurry.11 Yet, in addition to following the more extensive line of research analyzing state law
corollaries to the IDEA,12 this article will also explore the largely latent issue of possible federal
preemption for selected provisions arguably conflicting with, rather than complementing, the
IDEA’s provisions.13
Corresponding to the general structure and format of the previous articles, Part I
delineates the foundational federal framework of the IDEA requirements for expedited DPHs.
Part II addresses the issue of possible federal preemption. Part III identifies the scope and
contents of the tabulation of state law provisions. Part IV discusses the results and offers
recommendations for policymakers and for future research.

at 5 & n.34, 9 & n.59 (identifying several areas of overlap between pre-hearing and hearing stages including statutes
of limitation and discovery).
9

E.g., Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 7, 24 (specifically excluding expedited hearing procedures from the state
law analysis).
10

See sources cited infra note 20. The difference, to whatever extent that it is not disciplinary and not a placement,
is the danger-based forty-five-day option that is similar but an alternative to a judicial injunction under Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). For the blurriness of any such difference, see, e.g., Letter to Huefner, 47 IDELR ¶ 228
(OSEP 2007).
11

See supra text accompanying note 8.

12

Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 4 (citing previous state law surveys on the identification of students with
specific learning disabilities, behavior strategies in special education, and the state complaint process).
13

See infra text accompanying notes 27–50.
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II.

IDEA FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
In addition to extensive provisions for the pre-hearing, hearing, and post-hearing stages

of standard DPHs, the IDEA legislation and regulations establish special rules for expedited
DPHs.14 Their purpose is the speedy resolution of disputes primarily relating to the IDEA’s
detailed provisions for disciplinary changes in placement. 15 This purpose is clear in the text of
the IDEA16 and is a special application of the more general aim of rapid dispute resolution for
DPHs expressed in the Act’s legislative history. 17 First, the IDEA provisions expressly
incorporate certain procedures from standard DPHs as long as they are consistent with the
customized provisions for expedited DPHs.18 Second, the expedited DPH provisions specifically
permit states to establish procedural rules, except to the extent they conflict with the IDEA’s

14

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)-(4) (2018); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.532-.533 (2019).

15

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (2018); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530–.531 (2019). In the same way that the IDEA has procedures for
disciplining students with disabilities, states also maintain systems for resolving disputes involving discipline of
general education students. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Mark N. Covelle, State Laws for Student Suspension
Procedures: The Other Progeny of Goss v. Lopez, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343 (2009) (canvassing state laws for
suspensions, which adjoin the provisions for student expulsions). Given our focus on state law additions for the
IDEA’s expedited DPHs, we do not address these state laws, although they occasionally intersect with the
disciplinary procedures specific to students with disabilities. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888,
898–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that the HO had authority to reduce the length of a general education removal that
was not a manifestation of the student’s disability as a matter of FAPE).
16

See sources cited infra note 22 (describing shortened timelines in expedited versus standard DPHs).

17

Senator Harrison Williams, the principal sponsor of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Public
Law 94-142, the predecessor for the IDEA, made clear the importance of rapid dispute resolution in the
Congressional debate on the law as follows:
“I cannot emphasize enough that delay in resolving matters regarding the education program of a
handicapped child is extremely detrimental to his development. The interruption or lack of the required
special education and related services can result in a substantial setback to the child's development. Thus, in
view of the urgent need for prompt resolution of questions involving the education of handicapped children
it is expected that all hearings and reviews conducted pursuant to these provisions will be commenced and
disposed of as quickly as practicable consistent with fair consideration of the issues involved.”
121 CONG. REC. 37, 416 (1975) (emphasis added).
18

34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (2019).
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shorter timelines.19
The following framework serves as the organizing template for our analysis of state law
additions to expedited DPH rules:
1. Jurisdiction20
2. Complaint Requirements21
3. Timelines 22
4. Resolution, Mediation, and other forms of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR)23
5. Disclosure and Discovery24
6. Pre-Hearing Conferences25

19

Id. § 300.532(c)(4).

20

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)-(4) (2018) (authorizing parents to use expedited DPHs to challenge disciplinary changes
in placement, including manifestation determinations, and the LEA to use expedited DPHs upon seeking a forty-five
day placement change based on belief that the child’s current placement is substantially likely to result in injury); 34
C.F.R. § 300.532(b)(3) (2019) (allowing the LEA to repeat this danger-based procedure).
21

34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (2019) (providing the same complaint requirements for an expedited DPH as for a
standard DPH).
22

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(B) (2018) (specifying that an expedited hearing shall occur within twenty school days of
the request, and that a decision shall occur within ten school days after the hearing). Although this timeline appears
to be rather straightforward, it poses various interpretation problems, such as whether school days include summer
programming, and whether the hearing may be for more than one day, and, if so, whether it can include notable
periods between sessions. E.g., Letter to Fletcher, 72 IDELR ¶ 275 (OSEP 2018) (stating that when an expedited
due process hearing complaint is filed with less than twenty days in the school year, the due date may be in the next
school year); Letter to Cox, 59 IDELR ¶ 140 (OSEP 2012) (stating that any day in which a school provides summer
school for all students counts a “school day”). For the overlapping state law additions to deadlines specific to the
resolution period, mediation, disclosure, and discovery, see infra text accompanying notes 23–24.
23

34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(3) (providing that a resolution session must occur within seven days of the request unless
parties agree to waive it or use mediation, and that the hearing may proceed if there is no resolution within fifteen
days of the request). For the treatment of the overlapping timeline additions, see supra text accompanying text note
22. The federal regulations for expedited DPHs do not include ADR.
24

The disclosure requirements for standard due process hearings apply to expedited hearings. 34 C.F.R. §§
300.512(a)(3), 300.532(c) (2019) (applying five-day disclosure rule to expedited hearings). The only other discovery
provision in the IDEA is the parties’ right to compel the attendance of witnesses, which indirectly refers to
subpoenas and applies to expedited hearings. Id. at § 300.512(a)(2) (2019).
25

Neither the IDEA statute nor its regulations for expedited DPHs address pre-hearing conferences, but several state
laws have done so. See sources cited infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
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7. Decision26
8. Miscellaneous
III.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE DUE PROCESS HEARING LAWS
The United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause states “the Laws of the United States

. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 27 This
clause is the basis for the longstanding doctrine of federal preemption, which holds that state
laws are invalid to the extent they “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of [at least]
Congress.”28 Preemption is seemingly simple in that it applies to any conflict between state and
federal law,29 but its application is not particularly frequent or predictable in the context of the
IDEA.30
For the undefined reference to “Laws of the United States” in the Supremacy Clause,31
the Supreme Court has held that the phrase encompasses not only federal statutes, but also
“federal regulations that are properly adopted in accordance with statutory authorization.” 32

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(B)(ii) (2018) (specifying two placement orders within the HO’s authority in the context of
expedited DPHs). The U.S. Department of Education has interpreted this authorization as not limiting the HO’s
otherwise broad equitable authority. Letter to Zirkel, 74 IDELR ¶ 171 (OSEP 2019) (allowing the HO to order relief
“appropriate to remedy the alleged violations based on the facts and circumstances of each individual complaint”).
26

27

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

28

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).

29

E.g., Cipollone v. Lissett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“Thus, since our decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427 (1819), it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without
effect.’”) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
30

See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Who Has the Burden of Persuasion in Impartial Hearings Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 14 (2013) (discussing possible federal preemption of state
laws specifying the burden of persuasion in DPHs that differ from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49 (2006), that this burden is on the party challenging the appropriateness of an education program).
31

See supra text accompanying note 27.

32

City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988).
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Therefore, federal regulations promulgated under the IDEA can preempt state laws.33 Moreover,
interpretations of federal law and regulations by federal courts can also preempt them.34
However, it is unlikely that federal agency guidance, which does not carry the force of law, can
serve alone as the preempting source. 35
For the analysis of preemption by federal legislation, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that the most important principle of statutory interpretation is congressional intent.36 Further, the
intent of Congress is derived primarily from the text of the federal law in question. 37 However,
when federal preemption is by a regulation, not a statute, the focus is on the federal agency and
whether it is acting “within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.” 38 This focus
arguably extends indirectly to the congressional intent via the purpose of the regulation, per the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[t]he statutorily authorized regulations of an agency will
preempt any state or local law that conflicts with such regulations or frustrates the purposes

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (“Federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes.”).
33

34

Zirkel, supra note 30, at 14 (discussing various authorities).

See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 763 (2008) (“In the
agency context, only agency action that has the force of law should be regarded as providing a predicate for
preemption. Legislative regulations and self-executing orders have this quality; policy statements and interpretative
regulations do not.”); David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 583 n.124 (2017) (“Outside of the immigration context, commentators that have addressed the issue are
generally of the view that agency policies must first undergo notice and comment, or otherwise have the force of
law, before these policies may have preemptive effect.”). But cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency
Preemption More Muddle or Creeping to Clarity?, 44 TULSA L. REV. 197, 202 (2013) (noting the continuing lack of
clarity around judicial deference to agency views regarding the preemptive effect of policy interpretations and other
documents without force of law).
35

36

E.g., NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 3 (2019).

37

Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996)).

38

La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986); see generally Jonathan B. Brown, Casting a Broad
Net: The Federal Communication Commission’s Preemption of State Broadband Regulation, 54 CREIGHTON L. REV.
41, 58–63 (2020) (providing an overview of federal preemption of state law by administrative agencies).

62

thereof.”39
Over time, the doctrine of federal preemption has developed into three strands: (1)
express preemption, referring to cases in which federal law contains explicit preemptive
language prohibiting state lawmaking in some domain,40 (2) field preemption, referring to cases
in which a federal regulatory scheme is so wide-ranging or pervasive as to block any state
lawmaking in the same area,41 and (3) conflict preemption, referring to cases in which there is a
conflict between the demands of federal and state laws.42 Express preemption does not apply to
DPHs because there is no preemptive language within the IDEA. Similarly, field preemption
does not apply given the IDEA’s structure of cooperative federalism, which recognizes and
reinforces the role states have in providing and regulating special education services.43 Thus,
conflict preemption is the only strand that applies to the IDEA.44
Under conflict preemption, a federal law preempts a state law where compliance with
both is an “impossibility.”45 This situation often arises when a state law conflicts with an express

39

City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. at 64.

40

VANATKO, supra note 36, at 2.

41

Id. (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).

42

Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
43

E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. v. DeLorenzo, No. 13-CV-1613 (CS), 2013 WL 5508392 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2013); see
also Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 2 (“[T]he IDEA uses a model of “cooperative federalism”—states have the
responsibility of educating children with disabilities within a federal legal framework of requirements set by
Congress.”).
44

E.g., V.D. v. State of New York, 74 IDELR ¶ 279, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that conflict preemption is the
only theory under which IDEA may preempt state law).
Id.; see also, e.g., R.B. v. Mastery Charter Sch., 532 F. App’x 136, 141–42 (3rd Cir. 2013) (holding that it was
impossible for a charter school to comply with both a Pennsylvania law requiring schools to dis-enroll students after
ten consecutive absences and the IDEA’s stay put provision, and therefore the Pennsylvania law was preempted).
For a far-reaching take on what “impossibility” means in the preemption context, see, e.g., B.H.T. v. Sumner Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., No. 20-cv-00732 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2020), 2020 WL 5217107, at *29–31 (arguing that the
extensive discovery rules in Tennessee state law make it practically impossible for an HO to complete a DPH within
45
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federal law provision. However, in this specific IDEA context, Congress chose to “legislate the
central components of due process hearings”46 with specific allowances for state variation. 47
Even if compliance with both federal and state law is possible, conflict preemption may still
apply if the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”48 As part of the IDEA’s central purpose of providing a
free, appropriate public education (FAPE) to children with disabilities, the intent of the Act’s
DPH procedures is to provide an efficient, speedy mechanism of dispute resolution. 49 Thus,
states may add to the procedural and substantive requirements of the IDEA as long as such
additions add to, rather than subtract from, the rights of disabled children.50
We identify possible application of conflict preemption in illustrative framework
categories in the next part.

the time limits specified in IDEA). Note, however, this lawsuit ended on February 1, 2021, with a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice (on file with first author).
46

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005).

E.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (2019) (allowing states to create expedited due process hearing rules so long as
they do not conflict with timelines in the federal regulations); 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(3)(C) (2018) (authorizing states to
create different statute of limitation periods for DPHs than what is specified in IDEA).
47

48

V.D., 74 IDELR at *7 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

49

See supra text accompanying notes 15–17.

See Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass, 736 F.2d 773, 784–85 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (“[S]tates are free to elaborate procedural and
substantive protections for the disabled child that are more stringent than those contained in the [IDEA] . . . . [We]
hold that states have the right to enforce their own laws and regulations at the due process hearings.”); Evans v.
Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (“IDEA does not preempt state law if the state standards meet the
minimum federal guidelines . . . [but it] ‘does preempt state law if the state standards are below the federal
minimum.’”) (citing Amelia Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp. 889, 893–94 (E.D. Va. 1987)).
Admittedly, in the case of procedural DPH rules, it is not always clear that a state law addition would conflict with
the purpose of the IDEA. At the very least, state law additions that limit the rights of children with disabilities or
impede the speed and efficiency of DPHs will raise preemption issues.
50
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IV.

METHOD AND RESULTS
For this article, we followed the same method of the previous triad of DPH articles to

canvas state law additions to the IDEA rules for expedited DPHs.51 We began our research with
the official website for the department of education in each state, 52 limiting the search to linked
special education statutes and regulations as well as policy materials that explicitly had the force
of law.53 Likewise, our scope did not extend to judicial decisions, federal government guidance,
or commentary on regulations relating to expedited DPH procedures, though we refer to them
selectively.54 To ensure completeness and currency, our ultimate sources were the Westlaw and
LexisNexis databases. 55
The boundaries were ultimately a bit blurry. Although a close call, we decided to note,
but not include, the specialized variants of two states in our coverage. First, we excluded the
alternative “accelerated hearing” process in the legally binding Massachusetts special education
manual because it does not modify the IDEA’s rules for expedited DPHs.56 Second, we excluded

51

See sources cited supra note 1.

See, e.g., Dispute Resolution, IDAHO ST. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.sde.idaho.gov/sped/dispute/ (last visited
May 22, 2021) (providing links to, inter alia, Idaho’s due process hearing regulations); see also Pre-Hearing Stage,
supra note 1, at 8 (illustrating this consistent approach).
52

See, e.g., Idaho State Dep’t of Educ., Idaho Special Education Manual (2018),
https://www.sde.idaho.gov/sped/files/shared/Idaho-Special-Education-Manual-2018-Final.pdf (incorporated by
reference by IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.004 (2018)). Conversely, per the triad’s template, we excluded
interpretive state guidance or technical assistance that did have the force of law. See Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note
1, at n.53 and accompanying text.
53

54

For a comprehensive compilation of court decisions, agency interpretations, and other legal authority specific to
DPHs, see Perry A. Zirkel, Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers, 38 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 33 (2018).
55

For the resulting citations, see infra Appendix: Citations for State Law Additions for Expedited Hearings.

Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals 8–9 (Mar. 2019),
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/bsea-issues-revised-hearing-rules-for-special- education-appeals (specifying
an accelerated hearing process for health and safety concerns, inadequate services causing harm, or interruptions to
student educational programs).
56
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the process in New Jersey’s Administrative Procedures Act regulations and in its special
education regulations under which parties to an expedited or standard DPH may seek a
“temporary order for emergent relief” for four limited issues, including “a break in the delivery
of service” (e.g., disciplinary actions).57 Although overlapping with IDEA expedited DPHs, this
procedure only results in an interim, rather than final, decision. Moreover, per the triad
template,58 our search extended to other states with Administrative Procedures Acts (APA), but
none appeared to have provisions specifically applicable to expedited DPHs. 59
The next step was to review the identified state laws in relation to the aforementioned 60
expedited DPH framework. We limited our focus to state law provisions containing more
detailed requirements for expedited DPHs than the IDEA provisions.61 If the difference was
insignificant, then we did not include it in our state-by-state tabulation.62 Moreover, we did not

57

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:6A:14-2.7(r), (s) (2018) (describing emergent relief procedure for IDEA students); see also
id. § 1:1-12.6 (providing the same procedure more generally beyond the IDEA context with the same TRO-like
criteria but without the four specified issues).
58

E.g., Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at nn.55–56 and accompanying text (describing the approach to
Administrative Procedures Act provisions for state law additions to pre-hearing rules for DPHs).
59

Some of the state APA laws provided for expedited hearings, but not sufficiently connected to the IDEA context.
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1092.05.E (2021) (APA) (stating that a general administrative hearing shall be
expedited upon showing of "extraordinary circumstances" or the "possibility or irreparable harm"); ARIZ. ADMIN.
CODE §§ R7-19-106, -110 (2018) (APA) (allowing motions to expedite an administrative hearing, along with factors
to consider when granting such motion); COLO. CODE REGS. § 104-1-10E (2020) (APA) (describing the process for
the expedited hearing on a motion); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-106-501 (2018) (APA) (describing the
administrative process for an emergency action); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 616-1-2-.31 (2018) (authorizing emergency
or expedited procedures as necessary to protect interests of the parties or public health, safety, or welfare); MD.
CODE. REGS. 28.02.01.06 (2020) (APA) (authorizing expedited hearings for good cause).
60

See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.

61

Our state law additions analysis does not include placement or manifestation determinations, as these are not
sufficiently specific as to the requirements for expedited DPHs. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(a) (2019).
62

E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 §52.550(l) (2019) (requiring HO to mail a copy of the decision within 10 school
days after the hearing, as compared with the IDEA requirements in 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.514(b)(2)(iv), 300.532(c)(2)
(2019) for the HO to render a decision within 10 days after the hearing and provide it to parties); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 201.8(c) (2021) (providing that “[a] school district shall not be required to commence
disciplinary action against a student with a disability as a prerequisite for initiating an expedited due process hearing

66

include any state law provisions that import the standard DPH rules into expedited DPHs, 63
because (1) our framework already accounts for this incorporation of standard DPH rules, 64 and
(2) the previous triad of articles already tabulated any correspondingly incorporated state law
additions.65
As the final step, following the well-trodden path of the previous triad of articles, we
developed a table showing the state law additions to the IDEA provisions for expedited DPHs.
The columns in Table 1 correspond to the categories and subcategories of the Part I framework.
The entries in these columns represent four approximate, Likert-type levels: (x) = partial; x =
without any specific limitation or detail; X = relatively detailed or forceful; and X = unusual.
The comments column provides clarifying and additional information for the entries, crossreferenced to the letter of the applicable column. Moreover, an asterisk designates items in the
comments column that are most likely subject to preemption. Finally, per the model of the
previous triad of articles, the source citations for the state law provisions identified in the table
are in the Appendix.

to obtain an order of an impartial hearing officer pursuant to this section,” whereas the IDEA regulations do not
require a disciplinary action before initiation of an expedited hearing, 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(a) (2019)).
E.g., 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1191 (2020) (“An expedited due process hearing will be governed by the same
procedural rules as are applicable to due process hearings generally . . . .”); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 3018:2220-R-6.02(7.5)(i)(iii) (2017); 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 926.13.1, 33.1 (2017); HAW. CODE REG. § 8-60-77(c)
(2019); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 532.C.1 (2017); MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3530(5) (2017); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §
388.308.3 (2020); N.M. Code R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(18) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §
201.11(b) (2021); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(22)(c)(i), (iv) (2019); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365.1.6.17(b)
(2017).
63

64

34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (2019) (applying selected standard DPH procedural rules to expedited DPHs). One
example is applying the same complaint requirements to both standard and expedited DPHs. Id.
65

For state law additions to standard DPHs, see sources cited supra note 1.
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Table 1: State Law Additions to the IDEA Provisions for Expedited DPHs

Comments

AL

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

AK

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

AZ

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

XX

AR

X

B-mandatory expedited hearing request form*; C-authorizes HO, upon party's written motion with specific
justification, to extend time for decision from 20 to 35 school days via a written order*; E-requires disclosure at
least 2 business days prior to hearing; G-permits oral decision at end of hearing followed by written decision.

x

CA

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

X

CO

C-prohibits extensions.

CT

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

X

DE
FL

X

H-provides single HO for expedited DPH versus tripartite panel for standard DPH.
A-parent may request expedited hearing to appeal denial of extraordinary exemption from standardized testing.*

GA

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

HI

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

(x)

ID

X

IL

XXX

IN

X

B-requires signed request form (or document with same information); C-requires HO assignment within 5 business
days of request + written HO decision within 20 calendar days of filing + extension of decision timeline up to 25
calendar days allowed if parties agree and granted by HO*; G-specifies "substantial evidence" standard for Honig
type (i.e., danger-based) cases.

X

XXXX

X

A-allows parties to waive expedited hearing in favor of non-expedited hearing*; C-prohibits extensions.

X

IA

X

KS
A

B

C

D

E

H-HO may allow evidence in verified written form if not prejudicial to parties.
C-requires HO appointment within 3 school days of hearing request + prohibits extensions; E-parties may exclude
evidence not disclosed at least 2 business days before hearing.

X
F

G H

KY

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

X

LA
ME

X

MD

X

MA

X

MI

A-requires separate, standard DPH for non-disciplinary issues; B-requires all supporting documentation, matters in
dispute, relief sought, and witness names + makes written response optional; C-requires LEA to notify SEA within
1 day of complaint + hearing no earlier than 15 calendar days after request, unless resolution process completed +
2-day limit on hearing length unless good cause; E-requires exchange of documents and witness lists at least 2 days
before hearing + allows HO or requesting party to seek enforcement of witness and document subpoenas in court;
F-pre-hearing conferences not applicable to expedited hearings; G-specifies "substantial evidence" standard for
Honig type (i.e., danger-based) cases; H-prohibits ex parte communications.

E-requires exclusion of evidence not disclosed to the other party 3 business days before the hearing.
A-only available for students who have been removed from school for disciplinary purposes*; C-authorizes HO to
limit hearing to one day.

X

A-mandatory if child not enrolled in and attending an approved educational program due to code of conduct
violation, or if DPH complaint relates to placement of manifestation.

X x XX

X

A-excludes non-disciplinary issues within expedited hearing, and requires them to be heard in standard hearing; Cspecifies 15 calendar day limit from request to hearing + prohibits extensions; D-12 calendar day limit for
resolution process; E-requires copies of documents and witness list 2 business days before hearing; F-optional
conference call; H-authorizes decision based solely on documents if parties agree in writing.
No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.
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MN

X x X

A-no waiver of issues not raised; B-requires parent complainant to describe problem relating to manifestation
determination or placement, and LEA complainant to describe the behavior at issue and interim placement; Crequires HO appointment within 2 business days of hearing request + authorizes 5-day extension of deadline for
HO decision for good cause*; E-requires disclosure at least 3 days prior to hearing + authorizes HO to order parties
to exchange or submit witness lists, evidence, and information; F-required for scheduling and evidentiary matters
within 2 days of HO appointment.

X X

MS

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

X

MO

MT

X X

NE

X

X

C-prohibits extensions; E-requires parties to exchange lists of exhibits and witnesses at least 2 business days before
expedited hearing + provides other party with right to prohibit evidence not disclosed.

XX

B-must be signed and include date of manifestation determination and evidence of the FBA, as well as tentative
date for hearing agreed to by parties; C-permits 5-day extension for HO decision*; E-parties must disclose
evidence 2 days before hearing + authorizes HO to compel or limit discovery; F-mandatory + HO must prepare
order identifying issues and matters to be decided; H-HO is appointed without party input and have completed at
least one non-expedited hearing to be appointed.

X

X

C-prohibits extensions; E-requires disclosure at least 2 business days prior to hearing.

NV

NH

x X

NJ

(x)

X X

H-SEA appoints HO, rather than complainant preference process for non-expedited hearings.

X

B-requires statement of disciplinary grounds supporting request; C-requires parties to provide HO with mutually
agreeable hearing dates within 5 business days of request + hearing not to exceed 2 days and be held from 9 am to
4 pm + allows additional hearing time for testimony for a "full and fair disclosure of the facts" + prohibits
extensions; E-requires disclosure of evaluations and evidence at least 2 business days before hearing + authorizes
HO to prohibit evidence not so disclosed; F-mandatory at least 2 business days before hearing, and at conference
parties must exchange lists of witnesses and exhibits; H-authorizes HO waivers for “full and fair” hearing.
C-expedited hearing must be completed, not just started, within 20 days of complaint; E-requires disclosure at least
2 business days prior to expedited hearing.

X

x X XXX

NM

X

X

X

NY

B-requires statement of facts justifying entitlement to expedited DPH; C-prohibits extensions; D-joint option of
facilitated IEP meeting; E-requires disclosure at least 2 business days prior to the hearing if HO so directs; Fmandatory as soon as practicable + extensive HO authority for various specified procedures + HO must send
summary of conference to parties; H-requires joint stipulation of facts on shortened HO-determined timeline.
C-requires HO appointment upon LEA receipt of complaint + prohibits extensions.

NC

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

ND

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.
C-requires parent complainant to contact SEA the next business day after request and LEA complainant to contact
SEA same day as request + requires HO appointment within one business day of notice + prohibits extensions.

X

OH
OK

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

X

OR
PA

X

RI

E-requires disclosure at least 2 business days prior to hearing.

(x)

A-expedited hearing for an extended school year services dispute; C-HO must mail the decision within 30 days of
complaint.

(x)

C-expedited hearing must be completed, not just started, within 20 days of complaint.

SC

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

SD

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

TN

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

X

TX

C-prohibits extensions.

UT

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

VT

X

VA

X

hearing to 2 days + permits HO to shorten timelines if parties agree; F-mandatory; H-permits HO to waive
X C-limits
any procedures (except timelines) for "full and fair hearing."*

X

C-requires HO assignment within 3 business days of request + requires HO to document and notify parties and
SEA within 5 business days of any changes in hearing dates; G-authorizes HO to issue oral decision at end of
hearing followed up by written decision.

X
X

WA

E-requires disclosure at least 2 business days before hearing.

WV

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

(x)

WI

E-states that 5-day disclosure is inapplicable.*

WY
Totals

No significant expedited hearing procedures that differ from IDEA.

8

7 22 2 15

7

4

9
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Overall, a limited majority (n=31) of state laws provide one or more additions to the
IDEA’s expedited DPH rules. Conversely, the gray-shaded rows identify the nineteen states with
no change from the IDEA. The summary for the entries in each successive column follows, with
the focus, per the triad’s model, on the frequency per category, overall themes, and any unusual
variations.
A. Jurisdiction.
Some states (n=8) appear to restrict or expand the subject matter of disputes that can be
heard in expedited DPHs, raising potential federal preemption issues.66 One subset of these states
requires hearing officers to resolve non-disciplinary matters through the standard DPH process
and disciplinary matters through the expedited process.67 These state law additions draw a
brighter line between expedited and standard DPHs, and don’t appear to conflict with IDEA.
However, two states have made changes that appear to run contrary to the jurisdictional
requirements of federal law. Indiana, for example, allows parties to waive an expedited DPH for
subjects specified in the IDEA in favor of a standard DPH.68 This change raises a serious
preemption challenge because it reallocates the IDEA-established subject matter between
expedited and standard DPHs.69 Similarly, Maine appears to limit expedited DPHs to students

66

Supra Table 1.

See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(l) (2018) (stating that the HO “hear[s] only that issue or issues identified
by IDEA as proper for expedited hearings, leaving all other issues to be heard under” standard DPH procedures);
Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals 7 (Mar. 2019)
(requiring HO to hear only issues that meet expedited DPH jurisdiction on expedited track, while processing
remaining issues on a standard DPH track, and noting that the same HO should hear both cases); MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 8-413(i) (West 2018) (stating that if a child who is the subject of a DPH complaint is not enrolled in an
education program due to a code of conduct violation, the matter shall be heard within an expedited DPH hearing).
In a similar spirit, Minnesota law notes that issues not raised in an expedited DPH are not waived in other
proceedings, presumably to preserve matters more appropriate for standard DPHs. MINN. R. 3525.4750.6 (2018).
67

68

511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-10(e) (2020).

69

34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(1), 300.532(a)(1) (2019) (describing jurisdiction for both standard and expedited DPHs).

70

who are subjected to disciplinary changes in placement,70 removing the additional subject of the
danger-based forty-five day interim alternate educational setting. 71 As such, this Maine provision
conflicts with the IDEA’s jurisdictional requirements and is likely subject to conflict
preemption.72
Conversely, Florida allows the parents to use the expedited DPH process to appeal the
denial of an exemption of a student with disabilities from standardized testing, 73 thus expanding
rather than reducing the subject matter for this more rapid process. The change is likely not
subject to preemption because it is not “impossible” to comply with both the IDEA and Florida’s
addition, and the change appears to expand the rights for students with disabilities.74
B. Complaint Requirements
A similar minority of states (n=7) add “Complaint Requirements” to the IDEA
provisions.75 Some require parties to sign their complaints,76 while others require parties to
submit documentation or specified information in support of their claims. 77 Potentially more

70

05-71-101 ME. CODE R. §§ XVI.21(C)(4) (LexisNexis 2018).

71

See sources cited supra notes 10, 20.

72

See supra text accompanying notes 45–50 for discussion of conflict preemption.

73

FL. STAT. § 1008.212(5) (2020); FL. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-03311(9)(a) (2021).

74

See sources cited supra note 50. Another example is Pennsylvania, which uses the expedited DPH process when
parents disagree with a school district’s recommendation on extended school year services. 22 PA. CODE § 14.132(e)
(2021). This expansion of parental rights is also likely not subject to preemption.
75

Supra Table 1.

76

Idaho State Dep’t of Educ., Idaho Special Education Manual 245 (2018).

77

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(e), (f) (2018) (requiring complainant to submit documentation that
substantiates its position, including name of legal counsel, matters in dispute, relief sought, and names of testifying
witnesses); MINN. R. 3525.4750.1, .2 (2018) (requiring complainant to submit a description of the nature of the
problem relating to manifestation determination or placement, along with supporting facts); MONT. ADMIN. R.
10.16.3528 (2017) (requiring that written request for expedited hearing include date of manifestation determination,
evidence of behavioral assessment plan, and tentative date parties agree to hold the expedited hearing); N.H. CODE
ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.04(b)(7) (2021) (requires complainant to submit a statement of the disciplinary

71

problematic in terms of preemption are Arkansas’ requirement to use an expedited DPH request
form, and Illinois’ provision permitting the respondent not to submit a written response. 78 Both
of these state law provisions appear to conflict with the applicable federal requirements of the
IDEA for standard DPHs.79 However, the IDEA regulations exclude these requirements from
application to expedited hearings.80
C. Timelines
Within the “Timelines” category, a larger minority of states (n=22) have added to IDEA’s
deadlines for conducting an expedited DPH.81 Most conspicuously, several states purport to
allow extensions for the holding of the expedited hearing and issuance of the decision, beyond
IDEA’s twenty school-day timeline to hold a hearing after the complaint and its ten school-day
timeline from the hearing to issue a decision. 82 The IDEA’s silence about extensions for
expedited DHPs, especially given the express allowance for extensions of standard DHPs,

grounds that support an expedited DPH request); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(4)(h) (LexisNexis 2020) (requires
complainant to include a statement of facts sufficient to show they are entitled to an expedited DPH).
78

005 ARK. CODE R. § 10.01.5.1.A, 10.01.7.1 (LexisNexis 2008); 005 ARK. CODE. R. § 18.31-5 (LexisNexis 2021)
(Appendix with expedited hearing request forms); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(h) (2018). Arkansas has a
corresponding provision for standard DPHs, as discussed in a previous article. Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at
89–92 and accompanying text.
79

34 C.F.R. §§ 300.509(a) (stating that a model form may not be required), 300.508(e)-(f) (2019) (requiring a
written response addressing various specified issues).
80

Id. § 300.532(c)(1).

81

Supra Table 1.

82

005 ARK. CODE R. § 10.01.20.1-3 (LexisNexis 2008) (authorizing the HO to extend the twenty school-day
timeline for an expedited DPH decision up to thirty-five school days upon written request); MINN. R. 3525.4770.8
(2018) (stating that an extension of up to five calendar days for the expedited DPH decision may be granted for good
cause); MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3531 (2017) (allowing five-day extension for an expedited DPH decision); IDAHO
ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.005.f (2018) (authorizing HO to extend the timeline for decision for up to twenty-five
additional days if both parties agree). Unusually, Idaho shortens the thirty school-day time for an expedited DPH
decision to twenty school days, but ultimately allows extensions that would exceed the total federal timeline. IDAHO
ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.005.f.

72

suggests a prohibition—a conclusion supported by agency policy interpretations.83 Compared to
an explicit prohibition, the preemption question is more complex when there is silence. On
balance, however, it’s impossible to both have state law extensions and meet the federal
timeline, therefore indicating likely preemption. 84 Conversely, approximately eleven states have
laws explicitly prohibit extensions for expedited DPHs,85 which avoids this possible preemption
problem.
Various state laws add other timeline specifications for expedited DPHs that do appear to
raise major preemption issues, including a deadline for the notice86 and an HO appointment87 or

The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) has concluded that IDEA
does not allow extensions of time for expedited DPHs. IDEA Part B Dispute Resolution Procedures, at Item Q-7
(OSEP 2020), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/qa-dispute-resolution-procedures-partb.pdf (“IDEA makes no . . . provision for extending relevant timelines for hearings or reviews in the context of
expedited due process complaints.”); see also Dispute Resolution Procedures Under Part B of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 61 IDELR ¶ 232, at item E-7 (OSEP 2013),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/acccombinedosersdisputeresolutionqafinalmemo-7-2313.pdf (“May a hearing officer extend the timeline for making a determination in an expedited due process hearing?
Answer: No.”).
83

84

See supra text accompanying notes 36-50 for discussion of federal preemption.

85

COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02(7.5)(i)(ii)(B)(III) (2017); 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-10(b)(4) (2020);
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-40-30(b) (2017); Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for
Special Education Appeals 7 (Mar. 2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 162.961.3 (West 2021); 92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 55006.03 (2017); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(j)(11) (2021); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(8)(c)
(LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 201.11(b)(4) (2021); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-5105(K)(22)(d) (2019); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(a) (2020) (allowing extensions for standard, but not
expedited, DPHs).
86

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(h) (2018) (requiring the expedited DPH complaint to be made to the
superintendent of the school district in which the student resides and forwarded to the State Board of Education
within one business day of receipt); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(22)(d)(i), (ii) (2019) (requiring one-day
notice by LEA to SEA for expedited DPH complaint filed by parent and same-day notice if filed by LEA).
87

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 200.5(j)(3), 201.11(b)(1) (2021) (requiring appointment of HO upon
filing or receipt of expedited DPH complaint, as compared with two-day deadline for standard DPHs); IDAHO
ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.005.f (2018) (requiring appointment of HO within five business days of written request for
expedited DPH); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-3435(b) (2019) (requires appointment within three school days of hearing
request); MINN. R. 3525.4770.3 (2018) (requiring the appointment of HO within two business days of procedural
rights notice for parent complainant, or LEA complaint); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210.H.1 (2017) (requiring
that the LEA, within three business days of receipt of expedited DPH request, contact the Supreme Court of Virginia
to appoint an HO).
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additional details for the scheduling of the hearing 88 and its length.89 Unusually, three states have
tighter timelines, requiring hearing officers to not only begin expedited DPHs within twenty days
of the complaint—as provided for by IDEA 90—but complete them within that period.91
D. Resolution, Mediation, and ADR
Just two state laws (n=2) add to “Resolution, Mediation, and ADR” rules for expedited
DPHs.92 One of them addresses the resolution period,93 while the other offers parties the option
of a facilitated IEP meeting before the commencement of the expedited DPH. 94

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(h) (2018) (requiring HO to contact parties within five days of appointment and
to set a hearing date no earlier than fifteen calendar days following complaint or upon completion of resolution
period); Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals 7 (Mar.
2019) (requiring the expedited hearing to be held within fifteen calendar days after the opposing party receives the
complaint); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(e) (2021) (requiring the parties, within five business days of
the complaint, to provide the HO with mutually agreeable hearing dates); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210.R.3
(2017) (requiring the HO to document in writing any changes to expedited DPH dates and send documentation to
the parties and the SEA).
88

89

05-71-101 ME. CODE R. §§ XVI.21(C)(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2018) (authorizing HO to limit the expedited hearing to
a single day); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(c) (2021); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365.1.6.17(c) (2017)
(limiting expedited hearing to two days); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(h) (2018) (providing that the hearing
shall not exceed two days unless good cause is shown). New Hampshire has an unusual provision that authorizes the
HO, after witness testimony or conclusion of the hearing, to allow additional time for evidence if needed for a “full
and fair disclosure of the facts,” with a seeming corresponding allowance to excuse the prohibition of extensions.
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.01(j)(1) (2021); see also id. 1123.01(j)(8) (authorizing the HO to waive any
of the state’s specified procedures for expedited DPHs “to the extent necessary to preserve the full and fair nature of
the [expedited DPH]”).
90

For possibly intersecting interpretive problems with the IDEA timeline, see sources cited supra note 22.

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:6A:14-2.7(o)(2)(ii) (2018) (requiring the expedited DPH to be “conducted and completed”
within twenty school days of the complaint); 200 R.I. CODE R. § 20-30-6.8.2.C.1 (LexisNexis 2019) (providing the
expedited DPH must “conclude” within twenty school days of the complaint). The possible leeway is in interpreting
whether the generic reference applies to the decision or just the hearing itself. Pennsylvania requires the HO to mail
the decision within thirty school days of the complaint, effectively requiring completion of the hearing within twenty
school days. 22 PA. CODE § 14.162(q)(4) (2021).
91

92

Supra Table 1.

Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals 7 (Mar. 2019)
(shortening the resolution period from fifteen to twelve calendar days after the receipt of the complaint).
93

94

N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(18)(c) (LexisNexis 2020).
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E. Disclosure and Discovery
For “Disclosure and Discovery,” a larger minority of states (n=15) add to IDEA’s
relatively sparse rules.95 A common state law addition is to shorten the time for disclosure of a
varying scope of evidence to two or three business days before the expedited hearing, often
allowing or requiring exclusion of evidence that is not timely disclosed.96 The Wisconsin
provision more directly conflicts with the IDEA because it appears to contradict the IDEA’s
disclosure requirement for expedited DPHs, at least for evaluation information and
recommendations.97 There is a significant preemption possibility for the Wisconsin disclosure
provision in light of the IDEA’s regulatory language and purpose.98 Other notable state law

95

Supra Table 1.

96

005 ARK. CODE R. §§ 10.01.14.2, 10.01.35.2(B) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring disclosure of documentary
evidence at least two days prior to expedited hearing with mandatory exclusion for noncompliance); 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(h) (2018) (requiring HO to set a date no less than two business day prior to expedited hearing for
parties to exchange documentation and witness lists); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-40-30(b) (2017) (providing that
either party has the right to prohibit the presentation of any evidence at the expedited hearing not disclosed at least
two business days prior); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 532(C)(4) (2017) (requiring exclusion of evidence not
disclosed to the other party three business days before the expedited hearing); Mass. Dep’t of Elementary &
Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals 8 (Mar. 2019) (requiring disclosure of all documents
to be introduced as evidence and a list of witnesses two business days prior to expedited hearing); Mo. Dep’t of
Elementary & Secondary Educ., Missouri State Plan for Special Education, Regulation V, at 81 (2020),
https://dese.mo.gov/media/pdf/full-version-state-plan-special-education-part-b-2020 (incorporated by reference by
MO. CODE REGS. ANN. Tit. 5, § 20-300.110(2) (2021)); MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3530(4) (2017) (requiring the
parties to exchange lists of exhibits and witnesses at least two days before an expedited hearing and authorizing HO
to exclude evidence not disclosed within this timeline); 92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 55-007.11A (2017); OR. REV.
STAT. § 343.165 (2019) (requiring disclosure at least two days in advance of expedited hearing); N.H. CODE ADMIN.
R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(h) (2021) (providing that parties shall disclose all evaluations and recommendations to be
introduced at least two business days prior to hearing, and that either party may request exclusion of evidence not to
be disclosed); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-2.7(o)(3) (2018) (requiring parties to exchange relevant records and
information at least two business days prior to expedited hearing); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(11)(h) (LexisNexis
2020) (specifying that HO may direct parties to disclose evaluations and recommendations based on evaluations two
days prior to expedited hearing and may bar evidence not disclosed); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-05100
(2018) (allowing parties to prohibit any evidence introduced at hearing not disclosed at least two business days prior
to expedited hearing).
WIS. STAT. § 115.80(4) (2017) (“At least 5 business days before a hearing is conducted under this section, other
than an expedited hearing . . . each party shall disclose to all other parties all evaluations completed by that date and
recommendations based on the offering party's evaluations that the party intends to use at the hearing.”).
97

98

34 C.F.R. §§ 300.512(a)(3), 300.532(c) (2019) (applying five-day disclosure rule to expedited hearings); see also
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(2) (2018) (providing the five-day disclosure rule for standard DPHs). The proposed regulations
included a provision allowing states to shorten the time for disclosure to two days, but in removing this provision
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additions include limited allowances for formal discovery procedures. 99
F. Pre-Hearing Conferences
Although the IDEA does not specifically address pre-hearing conferences, a small group
of state laws (n=7) do so as a requirement for expedited DPHs.100 The most common addition in
this limited group is the requirement for a pre-hearing conference.101 Conversely, Illinois
explicitly excludes expedited DPHs from the pre-hearing conference provision for standard
DPHs.102 Additionally, a few of these state laws specify related duties or powers of HOs in
connection with pre-hearing conferences.103

from the final version, the U.S. Department of Education explained in the accompanying commentary “that limiting
the disclosure time to two days would significantly impair the ability of the parties to prepare for the hearing, since
one purpose of the expedited hearing is to provide protection to the child.” Assistance to State for the Education of
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,539, 46,726 (Aug.
14, 2006).
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 14-8.02b(h) (2018) (allowing HO to order witness or document subpoenas); MONT.
ADMIN. R. 10.16.3530(4) (2017) (noting that the HO may compel or limit discovery). IDEA is silent on the use of
discovery in DPHs. It is not clear that any one discovery rule would be contrary to the purpose of IDEA. At the
same time, there may be an argument that extensive discovery provisions, leading to delay in expedited DPHs,
would be contrary to the statute’s objectives.
99

100

Supra Table 1.

101

MINN. R. 3525.4770 (2018) (requiring the HO to hold a pre-hearing conference within two days of appointment);
MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3530(1)(a) (2017) (requiring the HO, upon appointment, to schedule a pre-hearing
conference); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(f) (2021) (requiring a pre-hearing conference at least two
business days before the hearing); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(9)(b) (LexisNexis 2020) (requiring the HO to
schedule a pre-hearing conference as soon as reasonably practicable); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365.1.6.17(d) (2017)
(requiring the HO to schedule a pre-hearing conference prior to an expedited hearing); cf. Mass. Dep’t of
Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals 7 (Mar. 2019) (authorizing the HO to
schedule a conference call at the request of either party or the HO’s discretion).
102

ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.640 (2018).

103

MINN. R. 3525.4770(6) (2018) (authorizing the HO during the pre-hearing conference to take appropriate action
for scheduling, jurisdiction, and witnesses as well as to order either party to submit records or information for
review); MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3530(3) (2017) (requiring the HO to prepare an order identifying the issues and
matters to be decided); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(f) (2021) (providing for exchange of witness and
exhibit lists at pre-hearing conference); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(11) (LexisNexis 2020) (requiring the HO at the
pre-hearing conference to determine jurisdiction, identify issues, and address scheduling, evidence, and other
matters).
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G. HO Decision
Only four state laws (n=4) add to the limited IDEA specification for the HO’s decision in
the context of expedited DPHs.104 However, these states only address the procedures, not the
scope, for the HO’s decision and then to a relatively limited extent. Without changing the
requirement for a ten-day written decision, Arkansas requires oral decisions while Virginia
allows the option.105 Also tangential, a pair of state laws specify the evidentiary standard for
LEAs in danger-based cases, requiring “substantial evidence” of the requisite likelihood of
injury.106
H. Miscellaneous
Finally, the catchall “Miscellaneous” category consists of nine state law provisions (n=9)
that variously add to the IDEA’s template for expedited DPHs in relatively minor ways. 107 A pair
of states provide for the option of written evidence, 108 while another requires a joint stipulation
of facts by the parties.109 A few other states add specific differentiations from their HO
provisions for standard DPHs.110 The remaining additions are barring ex parte communications

104

Supra Table 1.

105

005 ARK. CODE R. § 10.01.40 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring HO to rule orally on all issues at the end of the
expedited hearing); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210.O.14 (2017) (allowing HO the option to issue an oral decision
at the conclusion of the expedited hearing).
Idaho State Dep’t of Educ., Idaho Special Education Manual 39, 214 (2018); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, §
226.655(b) (2018) (including definition of substantial evidence as beyond a preponderance of the evidence).
106

107

Supra Table 1.

IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-41.1010(2) (2021) (allowing verified written evidence “when the interests of the
parties are not prejudiced substantially”); Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special
Education Appeals 8 (Mar. 2019) (requiring parties to inform HO, in writing, of their agreement to have the matter
decided on the basis of documents only).
108

109

N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(13), (18)(e) (LexisNexis 2020) (requiring parties to exchange proposed stipulated
facts and to submit a resulting joint stipulation of facts for expedited DPHs).
14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 926.32.2 (2017) (providing for a single HO rather than the three-person HO panel for
the state’s standard DPHs); MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3529 (2017) (requiring the SEA to maintain a list of HOs who
110
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and, more unusually, allowing for equitable waiver of procedures except for timelines.111 Such
waivers are contrary to U.S. Department of Education guidance, 112 but preemption appears to
apply to conflicts with the statute or regulations as compared with agency policy
interpretation.113
V.

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article completes the successive analyses of state law additions to the IDEA

provisions for DPHs, focusing on the specialized expedited variation. 114 As with the previous
triad, this latest analysis reflects the cooperative federalism pattern of “variety and
complexity.”115 It also reinforces the delicate balance between customized benefits and
burdensome legalism.116
The structure and entries in Table 1 reflect less numerous column and row totals for this
expedited variant, reflecting its much more limited scope of subject matter and rules in the
IDEA. Moreover, unlike the three analyses of standard DPHs, state APAs did not play a

have successfully completed at least one standard DPH under the IDEA and are willing to conduct an expedited
DPH and to select a HO from that list without party involvement); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.463.4 (2019) (requiring
the SEA to select an HO from its list on a random or rotation basis in contrast with the parties’ opportunity to rank
preference HOs for standard DPHs).
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.25(j)(8) (2021) (authorizing the HO to waive any of the state’s specified
procedures for expedited DPHs “to the extent necessary to preserve the full and fair nature of the [expedited
DPH]”); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365.1.6.17(f) (2017) (providing for equitable waiver of procedures except for
timelines).
111

112

Letter to Zirkel, 68 IDELR ¶ 142 (OSEP 2016).

113

See sources cited supra notes 35 and accompanying text.

114

Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1 and accompanying text.

115

Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 22 (summarizing the conclusions of the first three articles).

116

Id.; see also Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 24–25 (citing David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of
Legalization: The Case of Special Education Reconsidered, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 82 (1985) and Perry A.
Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An
Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2007)).
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cognizable role,117 probably indicating the IDEA’s expedited DPH process is too specialized for
procedural provisions of general applicability to impact.
More specifically, we found a total of 66 state law additions for the combined stages of
expedited DPHs118 compared to 254 for the pre-hearing stage,119 281 for the hearing stage,120 and
152 for the post-hearing stage121 of standard DPHs. This difference is attributable not only to the
narrow scope of expedited DPHs under the IDEA122 but also to the exclusion of state provisions
within the blanket importation from standard DPHs.123
Conversely, one area that state law additions to expedited DPHs raised more acutely than
the corresponding analyses of standard DPHs was the issue of potential federal preemption,
especially, but not exclusively, for the entries in the Timelines category. For example, the several
state laws permitting extensions appear to conflict with the inferable intent of the IDEA and its
regulations.124 Surprisingly, opposing parties have not yet challenged the enforcement of these
provisions. Both state policy makers and attorneys who represent parties in DPHs should give
more attention to questions of preemption. Moreover, HOs’ narrow interpretation and

117

See sources cited supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix.

118

Supra Table 1.

119

Pre-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 10 (Table).

120

Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 14 (Table).

121

Post-Hearing Stage, supra note 1, at 9 (Table).

122

Supra text accompanying notes 20–26.

123

Supra text accompanying note 63.

124

Supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
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implementation of such additional authority would not only minimize challenges but also
improve the length of IDEA DPHs— whether expedited or standard. 125
Recommendations for further research include systematic analyses of related sources—
such as state guidance and court decisions specific to expedited DPHs. Such scholarship, due to
the limited scope of expedited DPHs, would be most productive side-by-side with standard
DPHs where the distinctions between APA and non-APA jurisdictions and between the various
models of HO systems are richer and riper for analysis.126 Similarly, such combined attention for
a model code for state DPHs would benefit both policy makers and practitioners. 127
VI.

Appendix: Citations for State Law Additions for Expedited Hearings
Special Education Laws
AR

005 ARK. CODE R. § 10.01.5–40 (LexisNexis 2008); 005 ARK. CODE. R. §
18.31-5 (LexisNexis 2021).

CO

COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02(7.5)(i)(ii)(B)(III) (2017).

DE

14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 926.13–33 (2017).

FL

FL. STAT. § 1008.212(5) (2020); FL. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-03311(9)(a)
(2021).

ID

IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.005.f (2018); Idaho State Dep’t of Educ.,
Idaho Special Education Manual 39–245 (2018),
https://www.sde.idaho.gov/sped/files/shared/Idaho-Special-EducationManual-2018-Final.pdf (incorporated by reference by IDAHO ADMIN.
CODE r. 08.02.03.004 (2018)).

IL

05 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5 § 14-8.02b (2018); Ill. Admin. Code tit. 23, §
226.640–655 (2018).

IN

511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-10(b)(4), 7-45-10(e) (2020).

IA

IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-41.1010(2) (2021).

KS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-3435(b) (2019); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-40-30(b)
(2017).

125

See Diane M. Holben & Perry A. Zirkel, Due Process Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: Justice Delayed . . ., ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2022).
126

See sources cited supra note 1 for more background.

127

Pre-Hearing Stage, supra, note 1 at 24 & n.172 (discussing the prospect of developing a customized model code
for DPH hearings); see also Jane R. Wettach & Bailey K. Sanders, Insights into Due Process Reform: A Nationwide
Survey of Special Education Attorneys, 20 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 239, 280 (2021) (recommending that states review
their DPH rules for clarity and comprehensiveness).

80

LA

LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 532.C.4 (2017).

ME

05-71-101 ME. CODE R. §§ XVI.21(C)(4) (LexisNexis 2018).

MD

MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-413(i) (West 2018).

MA

Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., Hearing Rules for Special
Education Appeals 7–9 (Mar. 2019), https://www.mass.gov/servicedetails/bsea-issues-revised-hearing-rules-for-special-education-appeals.

MN

MINN. R. 3525.4750.1–6, 4770.3–8 (2018).

MO

MO. ANN. STAT. § 162.961.3 (West 2021); Mo. Dep’t of Elementary &
Secondary Educ., Missouri State Plan for Education, Regulation V, at 81
(2020), https://dese.mo.gov/media/pdf/full-version-state-plan-specialeducation-part-b-2020 (incorporated by reference by MO. CODE REGS.
ANN. Tit. 5, § 20-300.110(2) (2021)).

MT

MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3528–3531 (2017).

NE

92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE §§ 55-006.03, 55-007 (2017).

NV

NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.463.4 (2019); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 388.308.3
(2020).

NH

N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1123.04, .25 (2021).

NJ

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:6A:14-2.7(o)(2)–(3) (2018).

NM

N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.13(I)(4)–(19) (LexisNexis 2020).

NY

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 200.5(j)(3), 201.11 (2021).

OH

OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(22) (2019).

OR

OR. REV. STAT. § 343.165 (2019).

PA

22 PA. CODE §§ 14.132(e), 14.162(q)(4) (2021).

RI

200 R.I. CODE R. § 20-30-6.8.2.C.1 (LexisNexis 2019).

TX

19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(a) (2020).

VT

7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365.1.6.17 (2017).

VA

8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210.H–R (2017).

WA

WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-05100 (2018).

WI

WIS. STAT. § 115.80(4) (2017).
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